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INTRODUCTION 
 
Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review: Beyond Dichotomies 
 
Fergal F. Davis and Fiona de Londras 
 
 
The contemporary context of terrorism and counter-terrorism is one in which the impossible 
has become possible. For most people the conversion of a passenger jet into a weapon that 
would be purposefully flown into civilian buildings at the cost of thousands of lives was 
unimaginable before 11 September 2001; today those era-defining images have seeped into 
the collective consciousness. It had been assumed that debates about the morality of torture 
had long since been resolved; not so it seems.  An actual or perceived threat of terrorism has 
the capacity to greatly rupture our politics. It creates an atmosphere in which the ‘normal’ 
commitment of liberal democracies to constitutionalism and human rights is challenged with 
illiberal measures being introduced and potentially embedded. The possible impact of such 
measures, and the febrile politico-legal counter-terrorist atmosphere hold such significant 
possibilities that it is not surprising that understanding and responding to terrorism and 
counter-terrorism has become such an active field of legal, political, operational and scholarly 
endeavour. One approach to understanding and responding to (counter)terrorism is to 
sometimes reduce the debate to simple dichotomies: terrorist v. freedom fighter, terrorism v. 
counter-terrorism, vengeance v. protection, fundamentalism v. necessity, security v. liberty. 
However, such an approach is unhelpful; it masks the murkiness of the subject. After all this 
is an area in which we cannot even agree on a definition of the core subject matter; as Walter 
Laqueur declared ‘disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will 
continue for a long time and will make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding 
of terrorism.’ 1  The depth of this ‘murkiness’ is further reflected in debates as to the 
proportionality of responses to attacks or perceived threats, in disputes about the legality of 
new counter-terrorist mechanisms, and in political and other debates about how far a state 
ought to go to defend itself and its people against a seemingly uncontrollable risk of terrorist 
attack. In practice, this ‘murkiness’ has contributed to some extent to the design, 
appropriation, implementation and exercise of extensive powers of counter-terrorism, often 
without even a legislative basis. Even where legislation is used, it tends (at least relatively 
close to the attack in question) to be proposed by the executive and passed by a fairly 
compliant legislature.
2
 All of this means that, generally speaking, counter-terrorism tends to 
be characterised by (at the very least, an attempt at) executive supremacy and unilateralism in 
introducing extremely repressive counter-terrorist measures that sit uncomfortably with 
constitutionalist principles of proportionality, limited power, respect for individual rights, and 
equal application of the law.
3
  
 
This is of clear concern to many scholars, including us. In 2010 we wrote that  
 
                                                        
1
 W.Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (1987, Boston; Little Brown and Co.), p. 72. 
2
 F. de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (2011; Cambridge 
University Press), Chapter 1. 
3
 Although supranational bodies involved in counter-terrorism do not generally have a clearly identifiable 
executive branch per se, Murphy outlines how an executive type power can be observed in these contexts. See 
Chapter 13 in this volume, C. C. Murphy, “Counter-Terrorism Law and Judicial Review: The Challenge for the 
Court of Justice of the European Union”. 
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Within a system of separated powers, there are three potential responses to the 
limitation of individual liberties resulting from Executive actions during the 
times of violent, terrorism-related emergency: (i) trust the Executive to 
behave responsibly and lawfully; (ii) rely on the Legislature and the popular 
democratic processes to force the Executive to behave responsibly and 
lawfully and minimize judicial intervention; or (iii) call on the Judiciary to 
intervene and restrict unlawful behaviour produced by the Executive, the 
parliament or both acting together.
4
 
 
We both accepted that executive supremacy was inappropriate, agreeing that some restraint 
on executive power was desirable. The on-going use of closed material and a general air of 
secrecy in counter-terrorism give rise to an opaque environment causing us to be even more 
suspicious of simply trusting the executive. However, we disagreed on which of the 
remaining two responses would provide the most effective means of controlling executive 
power. Since then there has been some convergence of opinion; in some respects we are less 
absolute in our positions.
5
 However, while the common ground has expanded, the end result 
remains the same: de Londras favours enhanced judicial review while Davis sees judicial 
review as both ineffective and undermining of parliamentary scrutiny. Our debate — and our 
disagreements — form only part of a broader set of concerns about judicial review generally, 
and about judicial review in the context of counter-terrorism (or, indeed, other violent 
emergency) more particularly. This broader debate, which takes place across legal systems 
and continents, has a number of branches that are reflected in this collection: institutional 
appropriateness, quality, sufficiency and internationalisation. 
 
All of these elements of the debate about counter-terrorist judicial review speak to a core 
concern that we address later in this Introduction: what is the purpose of judicial review? 
Once we can ascertain that in normative terms, the secondary concern (how can that purpose 
best be achieved within and outside of judicial review structures?) becomes germane. The 
purpose of this volume is to deal in an open, although discursive, manner with that second 
concern. To that end, the collection brings together some of the key contributors to this 
debate in both scholarship and practice to engage in a dialogue, not with a view to resolving 
our differences but rather to exploring them.  
 
I. What is at Stake? 
 
Debates about counter-terrorist judicial review are important and wide-ranging, reflecting the 
fact that when it comes to counter-terrorism the stakes are high. As Lord Chief Justice Coke 
stated in Calvin’s Case the sovereign is bound ‘to govern and protect his subjects.’6  A 
successful act of terrorism demonstrates a failure on the part of a sovereign State to fulfil that 
most basic of duties. This can undermine public confidence and inspire moral panic. Indeed 
                                                        
4
 F. de Londras and F. Davis, “Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on 
Effective Oversight Mechanisms” (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19, p. 19. 
5
 For example, de Londras has recently called for a more “virtuous” politics to improve counter-terrorist law and 
policies both before and in response to judicial intervention: “Guantánamo Bay, the Rise of Courts and the 
Revenge of Politics” in D. Jenkins, A. Henriksen and A. Jacobsen (eds.) The Long Decade: How 9/11 Has 
Changed the Law (2014; Oxford University Press) (forthcoming).  Davis has attributed a greater role to courts in 
the process of dialogue. Where he previously saw them simply as raising an alarm through a simple declaration 
of incompatibility he now acknowledges a role for judgments to engage popular and parliamentary debate: 
“Parliamentary Supremacy and the Re-invigoration of Institutional Dialogue in the UK” (2013) Parliamentary 
Affairs forthcoming. 
6
 7 Coke Report 4 b, 77 ER p. 382 
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[T]errorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to 
assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or 
a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought.
7
 
 
If we accept this definition, for the moment at least, it becomes apparent that manipulation of 
the target is central to terrorism. Given that the target is often the public, this manipulation is 
likely to impact upon the quality of democratic debate. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
state of exception arising from an act of terrorism often has a distorting effect on democracy. 
For example, in the US post 11 September 2001  
 
[I]nstead of the rowdy, rhetorical deliberations appropriate to agnostic 
politics in a healthy pluralistic polity, the nation experienced a wave of 
patriotic fervor and political conformity in which the expression of 
dissenting opinions and the defence of civil liberties were equated with anti-
Americanism.
 8
   
 
This distortion of democracy has an impact on the quality of political debate and meaningful 
engagement with political society.  Where these negative impacts on democracy coincide 
with a general ‘security bias’ the resulting impact on liberty can be extreme.  Internment 
without trial, extraordinary rendition, control orders, and special trial procedures such as 
those employed at Guantánamo Bay have all been utilised by otherwise liberal democratic 
states on the basis that a terror threat needed to be faced down. The illiberal nature of these 
provisions is, in and of itself, problematic but it also has the potential to impact on the wider 
legal system through normalisation, (perceived or actual) illegitimacy of state action, and the 
mounting of a serious challenge to the core elements of constitutionalism. 
 
The designation of counter-terrorist law and policy as an ‘exceptional’ phenomenon, 
introduced in exceptional situations, is contingent upon what is known as the emergency-
normalcy dichotomy.
9
 This postulates that there are discrete and quantifiable situations of 
emergency that exist as aberrations from the (general) normalcy in which the state operates. 
This dichotomy is reflected throughout law at both domestic and international levels,
10
 and it 
is designed—as Greene has written—to allow for the concept of emergency to act as both a 
                                                        
7
 A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: a New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, and Literature (2005, New Jersey; Transaction Publishers), p. 28. 
8
 R.L. Ivie, “Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and Now” (2002) 5(2) Rhetoric and 
Public Affairs 277, p. 281. 
9
 See generally O. Gross and F. Ni Aolain, Law In Times Of Crisis: Emergency Powers In Theory and Practice 
(2006; Cambridge University Press), Chapter 4. 
10
 Ibid, Chapters 5 and 6. 
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shield and a sword.
11
 As a shield it is intended to protect the populace from generally 
repressive laws by holding the state to strict limits in the normal course of events; as a sword 
it is intended to give states the latitude they are thought to require to take firm and (we are to 
hope) decisive action against terroristic threats.
12
 However, as is so often the case, law and 
life are mismatched. The emergency in which exceptional laws and policies are tolerated has 
tended to extend far beyond the aberrational; it has tended to become entrenched (either 
generally or in particular regards) domestically and now risks doing so internationally. The 
risk of entrenchment is the normalisation of emergency measures; their continued application, 
their widening scope, their recalibrating potential. A core concern in any debate about 
limiting counter-terrorist activity by judicial review or otherwise has to be the maintenance of 
a division between the exceptional and the normal and, moreover, the quarantining of 
repressive powers in terms of time and scope.  
 
A belief in the likelihood of a return to normalcy at the end of a period of exception is 
dependent on a number of factors. Firstly, it seems likely that the capacity of the various arms 
of government to ‘reclaim their status and functions once the danger has passed’ will be 
dependent on the strength of democratic culture in the state.
13
 More fundamentally a return to 
normalcy rests on the ability to define the end of the state of exception. The decade since 11 
September 2001 has caused many to question whether the response to terrorism can 
genuinely be seen as ‘exceptional’ in the sense of it being temporary.14 As a result any 
measures adopted are likely to have an on-going effect. Furthermore, it can be demonstrated 
that repealing and unpicking complex counterterrorism measures is often problematic. For 
example, although the UK Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government expressed a 
desire to repeal the worst excesses of the Labour Government’s counterterrorism measures, 
their Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and Freedom Bill had only 
limited success if measured against civil liberties yardsticks that would be applied in a period 
of ‘normalcy’. So too is such unpicking dependent on the maintenance of our understandings 
of the content of rights during the crisis itself. As the contributions from Chan, Jenkins and 
Fenwick in this collection make clear,
15
 that which is exceptional must be named as 
exceptional; its particularity must be clearly identified even if it is to be accepted as necessary 
and justifiable given the circumstances in which it occurs. To do otherwise is to both 
potentially apply the emergency power to everyone (not just ‘the threat’) and to ratchet down 
the starting point of civil liberties and empty out to some degree our understanding of 
constitutionalism creating a diminished rights culture after the present crisis (and at the 
commencement of the next one).
16
 
                                                        
11
 A. Greene “Shielding the State of Emergency: Organised Crime in Ireland and the State’s Response” 
 (2011) 62(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 15.   
12
 Ibid.  
13
 A. Lynch, “Legislating anti-terrorism: observations on form and process” in V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor, K. Roach 
and G. Williams (eds.) Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (2 ed.) (2012; Cambridge University Press), p. 
151. 
14
 Ibid.; but cf the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A v. United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 301 
(19 February 2009) holding that temporariness is not a requirement of emergency for the purposes of Article 15 
of the ECHR. 
15
See Chapters 4, 11 and 14 in this volume, D. Jenkins, “When Good Cases Go Bad: Unintended Consequences 
of Rights-Friendly Judgments”; C. Chan, “Running Business as Usual: Deference in Counter-Terrorism Rights 
Review”; and H. Fenwick, “Post 9/11 UK Counter-Terrorism Cases in the European Court of Human Rights: A 
‘Dialogic’ Approach to Rights Protection or Appeasement of National Authorities. 
16
 An important contribution to the debate on control mechanisms has been the extra-legal measures model 
proposed by Oren Gross, which is fundamentally concerned with attempting to prevent this kind of ratcheting 
down. Under this model, state actors would make an assessment about whether something was necessary 
whether or not it was lawful, undertake the action if they considered it necessary, and make a full ex post facto 
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If one thought that emergencies were really containable, and that politics were not 
opportunistic when it comes to making the most out of a ‘good crisis’,17 one might argue that 
none of this matters too much for the short period of time that the emergency or crisis 
persists. However, history and experience tell us that this is not so, and that counter-terrorism 
without the counterweight of constitutionalism has significant repercussions for civil 
liberties. In this respect, counter-terrorism is an iterative and cumulative process. This is well 
illustrated by the journey from detention without trial to control order ‘lite’ in the United 
Kingdom (UK). The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 provided for indefinite 
detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism.
18
 The Control Order regime replaced 
this with a system of virtual house arrest that was repeatedly criticised by the Courts
19
 and the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights,
20
 and that in turn was replaced by the restrictive 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, now operating, that still allow for 
extensive restrictions on personal liberty.
 21
 Although this represents a movement towards 
less repressive measures, it has also resulted in a shift in judicial and political approaches to 
accept that being confined to one’s home for up to 14 hours a day and then limited in activity 
and interaction outside of that time does not qualify as detention and therefore is not attached 
with all of the safeguards that the law provides for detainees.
22
 The imminent introduction of 
‘Enhanced’ TPIMs also calls into some question how substantive that shift has truly been.23 
 
Furthermore, even the most entrenched and normatively accepted constitutionalist standards 
have been honoured more in the breach than the observance over the past ten years, calling 
into question their capacity to retain their absolute nature. The prohibition on torture is the 
clearest example of this.
24
 States have used the cover of ‘counter-terrorism’ to justify the 
torture of suspected terrorists (themselves, by ‘partners’, through the collusion of third states 
                                                                                                                                                                            
disclosure allowing for the risk of censure or of endorsement. In this model — crucially — laws allowing for the 
previously disallowed are not introduced; rather the positive law retains its integrity. The model is critiqued, 
particularly in its apparent distinction of the positive law from the politico-legal culture in which it operates. The 
model does not feature prominently in this collection. See O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to 
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?” (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011; D. Dyzenhaus, “The 
Compulsion of Legality” in V.V. Ramraj (ed.) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (2008; Cambridge 
University Press), p. 33; O. Gross, “Extra-legality and the Ethic of Political Responsibility” in V.V. Ramraj (ed.) 
Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (2008; Cambridge University Press), p. 60. 
17
 While White House Chief of Staff, Rahm Emmanuel famously said ‘You never want a serious crisis to go to 
waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.’ The video 
clip of him making this statement is available here http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1yeA_kHHLow  
18
 Section 23, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
19
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2006] EWHC 1623 (Admin); Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. E  [2008] 1 AC 499; Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2008] 1 
AC 440; Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269.  
20
 See for example Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth 
Report): Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010 (calling for the control orders scheme to be 
discontinued). 
21
 F. Davis, “The Human Rights Act and Juridification: Saving Democracy from Law” (2010) 30(2) Politics 91, 
p. 93; K. Ewing and J. Tham, “The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act” [2008] Public Law 668; H. 
Fenwick and G. Phillipson, “Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty and Due process 
Rights in Counterterrorism” (2011) 56(4) McGill Law Journal 863, p. 865 - 918. 
22
 See especially L. Zedner, “Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders” (2007) 60 
Current Legal Problems 174. 
23
 See H. Fenwick, “Designing ETPIMS around ECHR Review or Normalisation of “Preventive” Non-Trial-
Based Executive Measures?” (2013) 76(5) Modern Law Review 877. 
24
  The use of torture and coercive interrogation in the ‘War on Terrorism’ has attracted substantial amounts of 
literature. For an excellent collection of essays reflecting on torture in the ‘War on Terrorism’ see S. Levinson 
(ed.) Torture: A Collection (2004; Oxford University Press).  
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and by the involvement of private entities
25
). Indeed, torture has undergone a quasi 
rehabilitation following the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, located, it seems, at least 
partly as a result of information gleaned from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed under ‘coercive 
interrogation’ while held incommunicado in a secret prison. The Kafkaesque nature of this 
kind of scenario can hardly go unnoticed, but there now exists a culture, politics and even a 
scholarship around torture that was almost unimaginable a decade ago. Such a situation not 
only has implications for the immediate period of the emergency or crisis but also for the 
future shape of criminal justice, which can be affected by the ‘creeping consequentialism’26 
of counter-terrorist measures.  
 
In addition, the adoption of exceptional counter-terrorism regimes can undermine the 
perception of the legal system’s legitimacy. Legitimacy is, of course, a contested concept in 
law but in constitutional democracies it contains at the very least adherence to democratic 
principles of deliberation, equality before the law, and inter-institutional respect within 
separated powers.
27
 The past decade of counter-terrorism has called into serious question the 
legitimacy of a system of law that can allow for what seems to be the outright rejection of 
these core principles. The detention centre at Guantánamo Bay and the protracted attempts at 
prosecuting Khalid Sheik Mohammed illustrate this point. Detainees were sent to 
Guantánamo Bay so that they could be interrogated – not with a view to building a case for 
criminal prosecution but rather as an intelligence-gathering exercise.
28
 The existence of an 
extra-legal regime at Guantánamo makes it difficult to bring those detainees back within the 
‘ordinary’ legal order. Roach has argued that Guantánamo Bay became a ‘symbolic rejection 
of criminal justice norms’.29 The reality of that rejection becomes all the more stark when we 
consider the successful record of the US federal courts in prosecuting hundreds of terrorist 
suspects since 11 September 2001.
30
  It is difficult to maintain a perception of legitimacy 
around the prosecution of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and his co-accused when they are being 
tried by a tribunal whose legitimacy they reject on the basis of information that would be 
excluded for illegality in an ordinary trial, where their previous attempts at pleading guilty 
were ignored, and when the ordinary courts have provided a sound basis for conducting other 
terror trials.
31
  
 
                                                        
25
 F. de Londras, “Privatised Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and Rights?” 
(2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 96. 
26
 A. Ashworth, “Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism” [1996] Criminal Law Review 220; See 
also L. Donohue, The Cost of Counter Terrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (2008; Cambridge University 
Press), Chapter 1 and p. 71. The use of Control Orders against Australia’s ‘Bikie Gangs’, for example, 
demonstrates a seepage of repressive counterterrorism measures into the ordinary criminal law: A. Loughnan, 
“The Legislation We Had to Have?: The Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW)” (2009) 
20(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 457 . 
27
 F. de Londras, “Can Counter-Terrorist Detention ever be Legitimate?” (2011) 33(3) Human Rights Quarterly 
592, p. 597 - 604. 
28
 M. Davis, “Historical Perspectives on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the High Value Detainees’” (2009) 42 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 115. 
29
 K. Roach, “The Criminal Law and its Less Restrained Alternatives” in V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor, K. Roach and 
G. Williams (eds.) Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (2 ed.) (2012; Cambridge University Press), p. 91, 
108.   
30
 E. Holder, “Statement of the Attorney General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators” 4 April 2011 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html  
31
 K. Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (2011; Cambridge University Press), p. 213; E. 
Pilkington, “9/11 Families Angered Over Behaviour of Alleged Plotters at Guantánamo Bay” The Guardian (6 
May 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/06/9-11-families-angered-guantanamo-
trial?INTCMP=SRCH  
 7 
The use of counter-terrorist regimes in a manner that (at least seems) discriminatory further 
undermines the legitimacy of the legal system. Muslim communities have become ‘suspect 
communities’ 32  and elements of religious practice important to many (although not all) 
Muslims have come under what to many seems like Islamaphobic attack; laws have been 
crafted in expressly discriminatory terms (such as the section 23 power of detention under the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in the UK) or applied in what seems like a 
discriminatory manner even when neutrally worded.
33
 Suspected terrorists detained in 
Guantánamo Bay and accused of inchoate offences have their capacity to even see a lawyer 
severely curtailed before being tried (if at all) in military commissions without full capacity 
to build a defence, while people who perpetrate vicious gun attacks in the mainland USA 
killing dozens of people get full and fair trials. It is not difficult to see why at least some 
people at the sharp end of these measures lose their faith in the law, the state and the 
international community with potentially devastating effects in the future. 
 
II. Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review 
 
All of this shows clearly that when it comes to counter-terrorism the stakes are high, not just 
from a security perspective but also for law, the legal system, and the normative integrity of 
the state. The question with which this collection is fundamentally concerned is whether what 
we term ‘counter-terrorist judicial review’ can help to protect the state from the corrosive 
impact of counter-terrorism and ‘the people’ from its more invidious effects. In this respect, 
and for the purposes of placing parameters on the debate undertaken and engaged with in this 
book, we can define counter-terrorist judicial review as the use of judicialised processes to 
challenge state behaviours that fall into the broad category of ‘counter-terrorism’.34 Thus, 
‘traditional’ or administrative judicial review can be counter-terrorist judicial review, but so 
too can other judicialised processes such as challenges to the constitutionality or human 
rights compliance of counter-terrorist measures either in unique proceedings (usually 
constitutional challenge) or as part of broader proceedings (such as habeas corpus petitions 
or defences to criminal charges). 
 
At a conceptual level, judicial review is traditionally understood somewhat differently in 
different constitutional systems. As a result, at least a short meditation on the phenomenon is 
appropriate at this juncture. In systems of constitutional supremacy, judicial review has 
tended to have two different guises: judicial review per se as part of administrative law, and 
constitutional judicial review as part of constitutional law. The former is and was concerned 
with the fairly straightforward question of whether or not a particular action taken by the state 
(or some public body amenable to judicial review) was within the authority of the body 
concerned and taken in accordance with appropriate processes. The question, here, has tended 
to be one of process rather than outcome. Constitutional judicial review generally addresses 
                                                        
32
 On the concept of the suspect community see P. Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain (1993, London; Pluto Press); for the Muslim community’s experience 
see, for example, T. Choudhury and H. Fenwick, The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim 
Communities, Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 72 (2011). 
33
 See for example the operation of Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 in the UK (the port search provision), 
which is perceived as having a disproportionate impact on Muslim communities. (See T. Choudhury and H. 
Fenwick, The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities, Equality and Human Rights 
Commission Research Report 72 (2011)). 
34
 Although we refer to ‘state’ here, this can also encompass judicialised challenges to counter-terrorism 
measures undertaken by supra-national bodies such as the EU. This is discussed in Chapter 13 in this 
volume,C.C. Murphy, “Counter-Terrorism Law and Judicial Review: The Challenge for the Court of Justice of 
the European Union”. 
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the fundamental question of whether a particular law, measure, action or decision was in 
compliance with a constitution, the violation of which will normally invalidate the impugned 
law, measure or action. It would be overly simplistic to categorise administrative and 
constitutional judicial review as entirely separate phenomena; an administrative judicial 
review proceeding can (and frequently does) involve a question of constitutional compliance. 
However, administrative judicial review is possible without a constitutional question arising. 
Constitutional judicial review, of course, is fundamentally concerned with constitutionality.  
 
In a system of parliamentary supremacy, on the other hand, judicial review has traditionally 
been administrative and organised around the core concept of ultra vires.
35
 Under such 
judicial review, questions about executive measures concerned with a prerogative power (in 
which space many questions relating to security and counter-terrorism would reside) were 
generally considered to be beyond the reach of judicial review.
36
 The growth of a human 
rights culture, and — in states such as the UK in particular — the creation of written bills of 
rights by means of statute (such as the Human Rights Act 1998) has led to an expansion in 
judicial review to include something that looks far more like constitutional judicial review 
(albeit without the strike down powers associated with a system of constitutional 
supremacy).
37
  Mark Elliott has noted that this expansion has never been satisfactorily 
explained as a matter of doctrine, but is clearly connected with a normative belief that as 
much as possible the exercise of public power ought to be capable of being subjected to 
judicial scrutiny.
38
 
 
That core normative proposition is key to any debate about counter-terrorist judicial review 
and reflects the inherently constitutionalist nature of the questions it raises. If, at its heart, the 
debate is (as we think is almost always the case) about how rather than whether to ensure that 
counter-terrorist powers and measures do not constitute excessive exercises of power, then 
two important questions arise. The first relates to how those limits might be identified; the 
second to how we will assess whether counter-terrorist measures have exceeded those limits 
or not. 
 
The matter of identifying limits is not a simple one. It brings into the equation a number of 
complex questions: should limits be sourced only in domestic law, or does international law 
have a role here? How do relatively nebulous but normatively important concepts such as ‘the 
rule of law’, natural justice, and the principle of limited power get taken into account? Might 
it be that extra-legal concepts such as necessity or expertise ought to dictate where the limits 
lie or should they, at least, play some role in limit-identification? Certainly, constitutions are 
relevant sources, but the content of a constitution is not necessarily uncontested. Neither is 
                                                        
35
 M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (2001, Oregon; Hart Publishing). 
36
 Whether or not something falls within the prerogative power has long been subject to judicial review in the 
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the question of whether any particular constitution might leave the design, implementation 
and governance of counter-terrorism and other security measures to the executive with little 
or no application of ‘normal’ constitutional principles. In some constitutions — such as the 
Irish Constitution — one can find a clear and unambiguous statement of emergency power 
that is, on its face at least, expressly unlimited by the remainder of the constitution.
39
 In 
others, such as the US Constitution, ‘war powers’ management is institutionally allocated to 
the executive with some congressional involvement by means, especially, of the power of the 
purse but without much clarity as to whether the judiciary has a role or what other elements 
of the Constitution might apply to limit (especially) extra-territorial counter-terrorist activities 
or the activities of covert agencies. Thus, to say that ‘the constitution’ acts as a source of 
limits is to slightly obscure the complexity of that proposition. Furthermore, in at least some 
constitutional systems, legislation that has a constitutionalist nature can play a constitution-
type role in terms of identifying limits, but raises questions as to whether a parliamentary 
instrument can be (or should be) used to restrain parliament and the executive by means of 
judicial intervention. 
 
Similarly, questions of scope, limit and applicability arise with international law. Depending 
on the intensity of the measures deployed an armed conflict of sufficient intensity to engage 
(at least some) of international humanitarian law might exist. If international humanitarian 
law is engaged, international human rights law continues to apply but through the prism of 
international humanitarian law.
40
 Furthermore, the exact requirements of international 
humanitarian law are contested, especially in relation to non-state actors. So too are the 
disputes as to what role international law per se plays in extra-territorial activity, what 
account (if any) can (or should) be taken of it in domestic judicial review, and sometimes 
whether it even governs contemporary terrorism at all. The relationship between different 
international legal regimes is also a source of complexity here, particularly given the 
internationalised nature of some counter-terrorism measures that might originate through a 
UN Security Council Resolution, be applied in a unified way by the European Union (EU) 
through Directives and Regulations, and then implemented nationally though primary or 
secondary legislation.
41
 How do general international law (such as UN Security Council 
resolutions), EU law, European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) law and general 
international human rights law—all of which apply to the states in question—interact, first 
with one another and then with the domestic legal system? Furthermore, to what extent might 
international institutions (such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)) be able to understand that interaction and identify 
applicable limits by means of such understanding?
42
  
 
Once limits have been identified, we confront the question of how to ensure that they are 
adhered to. We ought to make it clear that in the ideal situation self-regulation would operate 
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to ensure compliance. Thus, government departments, the public service, coalition partners 
(where applicable), the public, and parliament together with the executive itself would create 
a regulatory mass that would ensure compliance, and laws, measures, plans, regimes and 
activities that overstepped the agreed-upon limits would simply not make it to the 
implementation phase. History, however, tells us that — by any standard — this does not 
happen. Any account of historical, or indeed contemporary, counter-terrorist measures by 
states and regional and international institutions will include an analysis of measures that 
were variously found to be unconstitutional, incompatible with constitutionalist legislation 
such as statutory bills of rights, in contravention of international human rights law, non-
compliant with international humanitarian law, ineffective from an operational perspective, 
unnecessary from a risk-assessment perspective and fundamentally counter-productive. All of 
this makes it difficult to accept the proposition — still made43 — that extreme deference 
should be shown to the executive in the context of counter-terrorism based on the fact that 
they know what they are doing and respect the realistic limits inherent in the exercise of 
public power. It is on this second question that substantial clashes in opinion tend to arise. 
 
III. Competing Perspectives 
 
Broadly speaking there are four topics across which opinion is divided in relation to counter-
terrorist judicial review, all of which are addressed throughout this volume, but in relation to 
which an initial reflection is appropriate. These are institutional appropriateness, extra-
constitutionalism and institutional dialogue, judicial muscularity, and internationalism.  
 
a. Institutional Appropriateness 
 
Questions of institutional appropriateness ask not only whether the judiciary is best (or even 
‘well’) placed to determine whether a particular element of counter-terrorism has overstepped 
the line, but also whether international institutions have any appropriate or legitimate role in 
asking similar questions. In the main, scholars contrast the capacity of the judiciary and the 
legislature to play a limiting role, bringing into the debate the inherent tensions between 
constitutionalism on the one hand and representative democracy on the other.
44
 A pure 
system of representative democracy would suggest that it is ‘the People’ who should 
ultimately decide the principles and policies to be pursued by means of their elected 
representatives. In this model there are no limits beyond the will of the People. However, 
constitutionalism gives us just such an exogenous limitation. As Tushnet puts it: 
 
Today, constitutionalism requires that a nation be committed to the 
proposition that a nation’s people should determine the policies under which 
they will live by, by some form of democratic governance. Yet, 
constitutionalism also requires that there be some limits on the policy 
choices the people can make democratically.
45
 
 
The question then becomes whether such constitutionalist limitations are desirable in a 
situation of exigency such as a terrorist threat and, if so, who ought to determine where those 
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limitations lie. That controversy goes to the heart of this collection and is the core issue when 
viewed from the institutional appropriateness perspective. 
 
Political theorist Carl Schmitt directly addressed the tension within constitutionalism between 
people setting limits and there being limits on that process itself. In Constitutional Theory, he 
articulated the difference between the constitution (verfassung) as a substantive and integral 
source of legitimacy for the state and verfassungsgesetze, the individual positive 
constitutional laws, which set out procedures and subsidiary norms for state action. The 
verfassung are derived from an original act of constituent power: that is, from a ‘conscious 
decision’ of a historically unified nation concerning its fundamental political form.46 The 
substantive constitution should be considered the innermost existential expression of the 
constituent body (the People). He thus concluded that the constitution, standing above all 
secondary laws, needed to be viewed as an original source of supra-legality.
47
 Implicit in this 
theory is a hierarchical concept of legitimacy: the constitution as an expression of constituent 
power has the highest legitimacy, and in order to protect this substantive constitution other 
laws might be suspended or temporarily set aside. This would be particularly true in a state of 
exception where, he claimed, constitutional laws could legitimately be ‘suspended’, whereas 
the constitution itself could not be subject to suspension and had to be considered 
‘inviolable’.48 It is apparent that within his scheme the only restraint upon the executive is the 
potential power of the people to exercise their constituent power. The legitimacy of this 
relatively unfettered executive is dependent on temporal limitation, although Roman history 
demonstrates the difficulty in ensuring Commissarial rather than Sovereign Dictatorship.
49
    
 
While rejecting the executive supremacy of Schmitt, many advocates of popular sovereignty 
still derive the legitimacy of constitutional norms from the constituent power of the people.
50
 
This brings us back to the original contradiction: a commitment to constitutionalism limits 
the choices available to the People. Parliamentary supremacists argue that the legislature – 
possessing as it does a democratic mandate – is best placed to represent the general will of 
the People. Thus the representative organ of the state ought to act as a check on executive 
power in the state of exception. This check may be deferential but it should also be robust. In 
other words, parliament may choose to accommodate the executive in light of some perceived 
threat to national security but it must be willing to interrogate whether an emergency exists 
and whether the measures proposed or actions taken are proportionate. This approach treats 
rights-enforcement as inherently a matter for politics. The role of parliament is to engage in 
the debate; if the people dislike the actions of the executive and feel that parliament is failing 
in its duty to restrain the executive they ought to exercise their power as a constitutional actor 
(most clearly by protesting and using their electoral power). Such an outlook can spawn 
many alternate responses ranging from a belief in institutional dialogue perhaps permitting a 
weak form judicial review, through to a Diceyean commitment to the unfettered supremacy 
of parliament. 
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Of course, there are those who argue that the constituent power of the People is neither 
capable nor willing to restrain the executive in the context of counter-terrorism.
51
 But, for 
some, an apparent process of social learning observable in US counter-terrorism illustrates 
just such a potential. Writing elsewhere, Mark Tushnet has claimed that the United States 
(US) has in fact ratcheted down its response to each successive emergency going from a 
wholesale suspension of habeas corpus during the civil war, to the internment of citizens and 
non-citizens (primarily of Japanese descent) in World War II, to the detention of non-citizens 
in Guantánamo Bay.
52
 While hardly a commendable record it might be argued that this at 
least demonstrates movement in the right direction, although seen in the round (beyond 
merely the detention context) the counter-terrorist regime operated by the US since 2001 may 
speak against such an optimistic reading.
53
 Even if such a historicist analysis is accurate it can 
be argued that it fails to provide any protection against an atavistic response reversing this 
slow but progressive trend. Furthermore, it does nothing to alleviate the situation for current 
victims of rights abuse; the inmates in Guantánamo Bay will hardly rejoice at playing an 
unwilling part of an on-going process of social improvement, nor have they experienced the 
‘Hope’ promised by President Obama.  
 
Others argue that in fact the conduct of global counter-terrorism since the attacks of 11 
September 2001 (9/11) shows that the impulse towards excessive repression has not waned.
54
 
It may be the case that the most intrusive and repressive measures have been taken against 
non-citizens and undertaken primarily abroad, but there are two important points to be borne 
in mind here. The first is that the particular targeting of non-citizens does not necessarily 
mitigate the measures taken in the eyes of anyone apart from the (seemingly) untargeted 
citizen. For the targeted non-citizen, extreme measures have been applied including detention 
without trial for up to ten years (to date), irregular trial processes in military commissions, 
extraordinary rendition, and torture. By any measure these are grave intrusions on personal 
liberties and the fact that they are limited to non-citizens does not make them less concerning. 
The second point to bear in mind here is that in fact counter-terrorism measures are being 
imposed on both citizens and non-citizens, sometimes openly and sometimes more covertly. 
These measures might not be as extreme as those imposed exclusively on non-citizens, but 
they are nevertheless significant. Surveillance — both overt and covert — is a hugely 
significant trend in the past ten years,
55
 as is the use of technology to both survey and govern 
our behaviours. The unimagined extent of such covert surveillance was laid bare by the 
Snowden leaks regarding the US National Security Agency PRISM surveillance 
programme.
56
 However, many of these mechanisms of ‘universal counter-terrorism’ are 
either considered to be ‘worth it’ for the purposes of ‘security’ or are so pervasive and overt 
as to be more or less unnoticed. Thus, the use by state apparatus of private corporations that 
we engage with on a daily basis (transaction tracking mechanisms, internet search engines, 
and airlines for example) may simply be unknown to ‘the People’. Even if these kinds of 
mechanisms seem initially to be relatively harmless, or at least to be proportionate 
                                                        
51
 F. de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (2011; Cambridge 
University Press), Chapter 1. 
52
 M. Tushnet, “Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror: Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in 
Wartime” (2003) Wisconsin Law Review 273, p. 283 - 294. 
53
 See Chapter 4 in this volume, D. Jenkins, “When Good Cases Go Bad: Unintended Consequences of Rights-
Friendly Judgments”. 
54
 K. Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (2011; Cambridge University Press). 
55
 See generally: F. Davis, N. McGarity and G. Williams (eds.), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and 
Comparative Constitutionalism (2013; Routledge) (forthcoming) 
56
 M. Gidda, “Edward Snowden and the NSA files – Timeline” The Guardian (26 July 2013). 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline. 
 13 
infringements, we ought to remember that the information and profiles built through this kind 
of everyday counter-terrorist governance can be used to identify individuals who then find 
themselves subjected to more extreme kinds of counter-terrorism such as asset freezing, 
inclusion on no fly lists, and maybe even extraordinary rendition. 
 
A further concern is that there is a real possibility — if not a probability — that ‘the People’ 
may simply be unmoved by the plight of those who find themselves at the sharp end of the 
counter-terrorist apparatus of the state. There are a number of reasons for this. The first is the 
real and genuinely felt fear and panic — described by de Londras as ‘popular panic’ 57— that 
a massive attack brings about in the populace. There is a danger that ‘we’ (analysts, 
academics, specialists — people divided from the reality of the risk) might become detached 
or even jaded, forgetting that terrorism and the risk of terrorism are experienced as real and 
frightening phenomena. For some theorists it is difficult to accept that we might realistically 
ask ‘the People’ to fight against these understandable and genuinely felt emotions to demand 
that their representatives would respect some kind of nebulous conceptualisation of 
constitutionalism and resist the introduction of measures that are unlikely to be imposed in 
their most extreme forms on them or people with whom they associate.
58
 The second concern 
about relying on representative democracy is that it might simply fail; supporting extreme 
measures might well be the politically astute thing to do, not only because of popular 
demands for repressive counter-terrorist measures, but also in some systems because the 
structures and dynamics of parliamentary systems reward compliance and punish 
opposition.
59
 Taking these kinds of views into account, some kind of ‘weak judicial review’ 
might be welcome, but absolute deference to ‘the political branches’ would be considered 
unwise. 
 
Thus, one of the core arguments in the debate about counter-terrorist judicial review relates, 
not only to whether or not representative democracy is capable of ensuring that 
constitutionalist limits are imposed to prevent these kinds of excesses but also to whether it is 
institutionally appropriate for any other institution of the state to undertake this function.   
 
Another element of the debate around counter-terrorist judicial review is the need to explore 
whether there really are only two alternatives to executive dominance: parliamentary 
oversight and judicial review. Increasingly, alternative mechanisms of accountability are 
being designed and implemented. Thus, Blackbourn examines the potential for independent 
reviewers to undertake significant roles in keeping counter-terrorist measures under a rolling 
review and, in particular, in challenging the underlying claims of necessity that the executive 
tends to make to justify the introduction or maintenance of certain repressive counter-terrorist 
regimes.
60
 On a less systematic, more ad hoc basis, commissions of inquiry have the capacity 
to at least expose executive excesses and create — or create momentum towards — some 
kind of accountability for them. The role of such ad hoc reviews is set out by Roach, using 
the examples of the Commission of Inquiry into the case of Maher Arar and the Gibson 
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Inquiry in the UK.
61
 In his contribution, Davis questions the utility in disaggregating our 
conception of parliament and judiciary to some extent, arguing that specialised parliamentary 
oversight committees or judicial enquiries might bring to bear the particular attributes of the 
different institutions (majoritarian democracy and independence, respectively) without their 
perceived institutional disadvantages (majoritarian populism and democratic illegitimacy).
62
 
In his contribution, Phillipson argues for a collaborative approach to oversight between courts 
and parliament in the context of counter-terrorism and rejects the general absolutism of 
judicial review scepticism and enthusiasm. Rather, he argues, ‘the legislature can only protect 
the individual through inserting judicial safeguards; and the judiciary must then police those 
safeguards rigorously, realising that to do otherwise is not to pay respect to the elected 
branches, but simply to betray the trust of the legislature and frustrate the joint enterprise of 
providing a serious, inter-locking constitutional check upon the national security executive.’63 
Thus, simply constructing the debate about counter-terrorist judicial review as one between 
parliamentary and judicial control simpliciter arguably excludes consideration of alternatives 
and ought to be avoided where possible. Indeed, Tushnet suggests in his contribution that any 
such debate can be avoided and an arguably more effective oversight regime introduced by 
treating counter-terrorism as, to all intents and purposes, another regulatory regime within the 
state and subjecting it to the normal rigours of administrative law.
64
 Whether this would, 
however, resolve some of the tensions that currently manifest in these contexts is questioned 
by Chan. In her chapter she argues that claims for deference (which would inevitably arise 
within an administrative law framework) tend to be accompanied by an implicit or explicit 
demand for substantial amounts of deference where the context is security so that merely 
folding this into general administrative law may not be unproblematic.
65
   
 
b. Extra-constitutionalism and institutional dialogue 
 
As already noted, considerations of institutional appropriateness do not necessarily require us 
to decide definitively between one option and the other; between judicial or parliamentary 
supremacy.
66
 Although legislative supremacy – in the traditional Diceyean sense – is 
somewhat rare, the Australian Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act (Cth) 2011 
exemplifies the model. Australia does not possess a federal bill of rights, but legislation has 
established a Joint Committee on Human Rights that is tasked with assessing the compliance 
of all legislation with certain human rights norms. As under the, UK Human Rights Act, 1998 
the proposer of a Bill must make a statement of human rights compliance, but unlike the UK 
model there is no mechanism for judicial or any other oversight. The only oversight 
mechanism is parliamentary. This will be dealt with in greater detail in the chapter by Fergal 
Davis. Notwithstanding this example, the general political and constitutional reality is such 
that in fact the supremacy of one institution over the other is unlikely to arise in any situation, 
not to mention in a situation of extreme tension and political disruption. Taking this into 
account, scholars attempting to resolve the contradiction between constitutionalism and 
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representative democracy have identified a new commonwealth, or dialogic, model of 
review.
67
 Examples of new commonwealth review include the ‘notwithstanding clause’ 
contained in section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 1982,
68
 the UK Human Rights Act 
1998, and the Australian State of Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act 2006 (Vic). The approaches are operationally different but at their core each new 
commonwealth model acknowledges that there can be ‘competing reasonable interpretations 
of constitutional provisions’;69 they enable the judiciary to express their interpretation but 
ensure that, in the end, only the legislature’s interpretation is legally effective. The 
attractiveness of such an approach is that it seeks to emphasise the strengths and weaknesses 
of each institution.  Directly elected legislatures are thought to be ‘less likely than courts to 
be attentive to the limits constitutionalism places on democratic self-governance’ 70  but 
unelected courts are accused of lacking democratic legitimacy.  By allowing courts to declare 
that acts of parliament are inconsistent (or incompatible) with human rights norms we 
empower the judiciary to sound the alarm.
71
  Once the issue has been brought to the 
legislature’s attention, we can then advance the value of democratic self-governance by 
leaving the final decision to the legislature.
72
  Theoretically, this dialogic approach permits 
courts to robustly defend rights while deferring to ‘legislative sequels that evidence clear and 
considered disagreement with their rulings.’ 73  Such a dialogic approach, however, does 
require courts to engage in a meaningful review of measures and to approach with some 
caution claims made by the executive. In their contributions to this volume, Roger 
Masterman and Helen Fenwick emphasise not only that this is necessary, but also that it is 
sometimes lacking even in contexts where courts generally engage in stricter review. 
Considering counter-terrorist judicial review in the UK, Masterman compellingly traces the 
residual caution of courts to scrutinise claims as to security and counter-terrorism in judicial 
review even while the scope and nature of judicial review in that jurisdiction has been 
expanding.
74
 Considering the European Court of Human Rights since 9/11, Fenwick argues 
that rather than dialogue with the UK government there has been appeasement influenced, to 
at least some extent, by the broader tensions between the UK and the Court.
75
 These two 
contributions emphasise that claims of dialogue are sustainable only inasmuch as the court 
takes a robust approach to scrutiny in the first place. 
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Extra-constitutionalism can be seen as a subset of dialogic review, which has been proposed 
in the US context. Rather than declaring an executive act or piece of legislation to be 
constitutional or unconstitutional the courts can declare it to be extra-constitutional. That is, 
beyond the scope of responses anticipated by the constitution. The mechanism would operate 
as follows:  
 
[T]he government introduces legislation that is inherently suspect from the 
prospective of the rule of law, but avoids … provisions that seem in flagrant 
violation of rule of law principles.  The dirty work is done by those charged 
with implementing the law and the government expects that judges who hear 
challenges to the validity of particular acts will put aside their role as 
guardians of the rule of law because in issue is the security of the state.
76
 
 
Extra-constitutionalism enables the courts to acknowledge the exceptional nature of the 
proposed acts and leaves it to the other constitutional actors to determine if such exceptional 
measures are justified. In that respect extra-constitutionalism is similar to other forms of 
institutional dialogue. Crucially, such approaches avoid the need for courts to justify 
abhorrent acts as somehow constitutional or to boldly strike down executive measures in the 
face of genuine concerns that such measures might actually be necessary. As Justice Jackson 
noted in Korematsu:  
 
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms 
to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the 
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated … 
[a] principle [that] lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that bring forward a plausible claim of urgent need.
77
 
 
 As a result, extra-constitutionalists argue that ‘it is better to have emergency powers 
exercised in an extra-constitutional way, so that everyone understands that the actions are 
extraordinary, than to have the actions rationalised away as consistent with the constitution 
and thereby normalised’.78  Extra-constitutionalism forms part of an institutional dialogue 
because the courts are placing the other actors on alert that the actions complained of are not 
within the category of actions that can be deemed constitutional. That places the 
responsibility on those other actors to determine if they are satisfied that such exceptional 
actions are justified.  
 
A structure of dialogue is not confined to Commonwealth states, of course. Even in states 
with constitutional supremacy a dialogic approach to counter-terrorist judicial review is 
possible, with courts using judicial review to try to ‘nudge’ the political branches towards a 
more limited and rights-compliant approach to counter-terrorism even in the absence of 
striking an impugned measure down. In the United States, for example, numerous 
commentators have categorised the ‘to and fro’ between the US Supreme Court and the 
political branches in relation to Guantánamo Bay as a form of dialogue by which the 
Supreme Court slowly moved the detention centre there from a place where detainees had no 
effective review mechanism to one in which those detained there have recognised 
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constitutional habeas corpus rights.
79
 In spite of that progression — which seems at least to 
remove part of the legal rationale for detaining people in Guantánamo Bay
80
 — the detention 
centre remains open and all attempts to close it have been blocked by Congress, either as an 
act of political constitutionalism (as claimed by Tushnet
81
) or as a result of pure quotidian 
politics (as claimed by de Londras
82
). The example of Guantánamo Bay litigation in the US 
suggests that muscular judicial review is not incapable of having a dialogic impact but also 
highlights that it does not necessarily over judicialise politics. Although in some jurisdictions 
— such as the UK — there is now an established record of changing counter-terrorist 
measures so that they become more rights compliant than they previously were in response to 
judicial findings of incompatibility, this is not the inevitable outcome of such cases. Concerns 
about the judicialisation of politics, then, which Masterman addresses in his chapter,
83
 must 
take the broader constitutional and political climate into account.  
 
c. Judicial Muscularity 
 
In the ordinary course of events (or what we might call ‘normalcy’), we tend to rely on the 
judiciary to identify where the limits of allowable government action lie. This is so even in 
systems of parliamentary supremacy where, as considered above, the doctrine of ultra vires 
provides the key underlying principle justifying judicial review. Ultra vires, by means of 
reminder, requires that institutions of the state do not exercise power to any greater extent 
than expressly permitted and in this way constitutes a clear manifestation of the 
constitutionalist principle of limited power. In jurisdictions defined by constitutional 
supremacy, the power to decide on limits of allowable governmental action lies clearly within 
the jurisdiction of the courts. However, even in these jurisdictions there is an unedifying 
history of what we would call counter-terrorist judicial review. The same goes for the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whose record in relation to trying to restrain 
repressive state practices done in the name of ‘national security’ has rarely been described as 
impressive.
84
 
 
Historically, domestic and some international courts have been faced with two questions 
when it comes to counter-terrorist or other national security measures: (i) do the extant 
 
circumstances justify the imposition of some kind of extraordinary security measures with 
individual rights’ impacts beyond what we would normally consider acceptable? And (ii) if 
so, are the measures under direct challenge in the case at Bar within the limits of 
acceptability, even taking these extraordinary circumstances into account. The first of these 
questions — what we might call the threshold question — is one in relation to which courts 
have traditionally shown, and continue to show, substantial deference to the executive’s 
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determination of levels of risk.
85
 This is one area in which, it is often argued, judicial 
deference is appropriate if not advisable because it is essentially an assessment of knowledge 
and factors that require a particular kind of expertise to understand, compute and assess. 
There are some scholars who argue that this threshold question should receive a closer degree 
of scrutiny by the courts,
86
 but in the main the concentration in the scholarship has been on 
the second, substantive, question relating to the impugned counter-terrorist measures. 
 
Here too the historical record of courts shows that a high degree of deference has been 
shown. The classical examples are the US Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu87 and the 
UK House of Lord’s decision in Liversidge88  in both of which a substantial degree of 
privilege was assigned to the judgment of political and military actors as to whether or not 
certain (in both cases internment) measures were necessary, with necessity being used as a 
quasi-equivalent to appropriateness or acceptability. These cases are not particularly 
exceptional, it has to be said; other superior domestic courts have made similar decisions,
89
 as 
has the ECtHR.
90
 This record often feeds into arguments about institutional appropriateness 
inasmuch as it is taken as evidence of poor quality decision-making by courts with the 
resultant argument being that if courts are going to make such poor decisions perhaps they 
ought to make no decisions at all and simply leave it to the political branches to deal with 
national security measures.
91
 In making decisions of this kind, it is argued, courts are 
simultaneously leaving the political branches’ judgement undisturbed without any particular 
scrutiny and removing incentives for rigorous deliberation at the political level. Indeed, this 
is the core of the extra-constitutionalism thesis itself.
92
  
 
However, at least some scholars have argued that the judicial record in the ten or so years 
since the attacks of 9/11 has been rather different to the historical one and that in fact there 
has been a lesser degree of judicial deference — or a greater degree of judicial muscularity — 
than was previously the case.
93
 Again there are a number of causes célèbres that are 
frequently cited to support this position: the Belmarsh decision in the UK,
94
 Hamdan
95
 and 
Boumediene
96
 in the US, Saadi
97
 and Othman (Abu Qatada)
98
 in the ECtHR These decisions, 
however, also have their critics. On the one hand are those who argue — as alluded to above 
— that judicial adjudication of counter-terrorist measures is simply institutionally 
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inappropriate.
99
 So too are there those who argue that, even if courts appear to be being less 
deferential than was previously the case, the quality of decision-making remains questionable 
either because there is a misapplication of law
100
 or because courts are giving the impression 
of muscularity while actually acceding too easily to executive claims and, in so doing, 
recalibrating downwards our previous understandings of some core concepts (such as 
detention and due process).
101
 Further criticisms accuse ‘muscular’ courts of in fact engaging 
in a futile exercise designed to maintain the relevance of the judiciary in spite of courts’ 
frequent incapacity (or unwillingness) to actually secure an adequate and appropriate remedy 
for litigants.
102
  
 
The debate on judicial muscularity, then, cuts across a number of themes: institutional 
appropriateness, quality and capacity in particular. Contributors to this collection address all 
of these. In his chapter David Jenkins critiques superior courts for abandoning a distinction 
between the citizen and non-citizen, claiming that such a distinction in fact maintained a 
higher general level of rights protection because, without it, all are subjected to more 
repressive laws.
103
 For Jenkins, then, muscularity from a rights-based perspective is a double-
edged sword. However, even when appearing to be muscular superior courts can sometimes 
be too vague in laying down principles or overly selective in what they will review. In his 
chapter Jules Lobel identifies these trends in the United States where, he says, the Supreme 
Court’s lack of clarity as to what detainees in Guantánamo Bay are actually entitled to has 
enabled a hollowing out of celebrated judgments such as Boumediene
104
 in reality while, at 
the same time, the Supreme Court refuses to consider cases relating to detention in Bagram, 
for example, thus further narrowing its capacity to meaningfully improve rights protection.
105
 
What Jenkins and Lobel suggest when read together is that what appears to be muscularity in 
particular cases must actually be seen in its round before any qualitative conclusions are 
reached. In her contribution de Londras argues, somewhat in contrast to this, that there may 
be an implicit muscularity in some cases that appear, at least at first, to have been futile or 
unsatisfactory because courts have felt constrained in their findings as a result of concerns as 
to inter-state comity and foreign affairs.
106
 Rather than see these cases as simply 
unsatisfactory, de Londras argues that understanding them in the context of a reflexive state 
built on constitutionalist principles one can see within them the potential for what she calls 
regulatory constitutionalism.   
 
 
d. Internationalism 
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In the current climate it is practically impossible to adequately discuss counter-terrorism and 
counter-terrorist judicial review without addressing internationalism to at least some extent. 
This is so not only because of the internationalised nature of what is perceived to be the main 
contemporary terrorist threat and, indeed, the internationalism of many of the responses but 
also because of the now clearly enmeshed nature of the national and the international and the 
challenge that counter-terrorist potentially poses to that. 
 
This enmeshing is a result of various factors that have been widely considered elsewhere and 
need no more than a mention here: globalisation, international cooperation, the proliferation 
and governance capacities of international institutions, the emergence and growing 
importance of internationalised technologies of governance, the development of global and 
regional human rights regimes including enforcement mechanisms, and the creation of close 
regional unions sometimes with autonomous constitutional power. All of these elements are 
important in counter-terrorism. Globalisation both colours the risk that terrorism poses and to 
at least some extent dictates the response; traditions and links of international cooperation 
extend into (and are sometimes challenged by) counter-terrorist activity; international 
institutions create autonomous counter-terrorist policies and powers and (in at least the case 
of the EU) give effect to international obligations relating to counter-terrorism, and so on. 
When it comes to counter-terrorist judicial review, internationalism plays a number of roles 
that are significant here. 
 
The first role relates, as already noted, to the identification of limits to which we intend to 
hold the state in the context of counter-terrorism. Even where domestic law and politics may 
become saturated in fear, panic and zealous counter-terrorism, international legal standards 
arguably have some resilience against panic that can identify them as more stable standards 
upon which to rely than domestic ones.
107
 This can then act as a mechanism for courts in 
assessing whether or not any impugned activity was within the bounds permissible. This role 
extends most obviously, perhaps, to the standards found in international human rights law but 
can also be played by international humanitarian law. It is likely, at least in dualist states, that 
the extent to which what we might here describe as a rule of international law plays such a 
role will be determined by its domestic status (with incorporated provisions being more likely 
to be invoked and imposed by courts than unincorporated provisions) but incorporation has 
not shown itself to be definitive in this respect.
108
 Counter-terrorist judicial review at the 
domestic level, then, has a potentially complex relationship with international law. On the 
one hand it can involve the use (or rejection) of international standards to shape judicial 
response; on the other hand it can either reinforce or call into question the relevance of 
international law and international principles in situations of risk when sovereignty arguably 
finds its fullest voice. In her chapter Helen Duffy outlines the ways in which international 
standards are being used in litigation and criminal prosecutions in the attempt to achieve 
accountability for repressive counter-terrorist measures.
109
 In contrast, perhaps, to the 
somewhat critical approach adopted by Fenwick in this volume in the context of the ECtHR, 
Duffy exhibits a faith in international law’s capacity to aid in laying down clear limitations 
that emanates from her use of these standards in practice. Her chapter also, however, makes 
clear that a core challenge to successful counter-terrorist judicial review has little to do with 
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the identification of standards or institutional concerns but rather with access to information 
and the capacity to effectively represent one’s client in an atmosphere that is saturated with 
secrecy. In his chapter, Rytter identifies the critical role that the standards laid down by the 
ECtHR have played in emboldening Danish courts — traditionally extremely deferential to 
executive claims of security need — to enforce constitutionalist limits in the counter-terrorist 
context, reiterating the role that internationalisation can play in counter-terrorist judicial 
review.
110
 
 
Internationalism and counter-terrorist judicial review are also related inasmuch as 
international courts and other adjudicative mechanisms can be used to play a judicial review 
role when a litigant does not achieve satisfaction domestically or when the impugned 
measure originates from an international institution that has a judicial review body within it. 
Regional human rights courts, which generally enjoy subsidiary jurisdiction and are therefore 
used where domestic legal remedies have been exhausted, clearly play an important role in 
counter-terrorist judicial review. This is not only because they themselves can carry out 
judicial review against applicable standards, but also because their approach to this role has 
the potential to influence how domestic courts from member states are likely to handle 
difficult questions of — for example — deference and the content of rights in a situation of 
emergency in subsequent proceedings.
111
 Where international institutions with judicial review 
mechanisms have themselves undertaken counter-terrorism and introduced repressive 
measures their own judicial review procedures come into play. The EU is the obvious 
example in this context and Murphy considers the potential for the judgments of its ECJ and 
the ECtHR to have significant impacts for the rule of law in a counter-terrorist context both 
within and beyond its member states, while also challenging the widely held view that, after 
the Kadi jurisprudence, the ECJ is ideally placed to protect the rule of law in the counter-
terrorist context.
112
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At its very heart, what is at stake when we debate whether and how counter-terrorism can be 
limited and especially the possible role of judicial review in such limiting exercises is a 
commitment to constitutionalism even in a situation of crisis, whether that be of a terrorist or 
a counter-terrorist nature. The contributors to this book share a commitment to the concept of 
constitutionalism, containing as it does a nebulous notion of justice inasmuch as it commits to 
power being openly exercised, limited, and accountable. What is at stake when we debate 
the appropriateness, effectiveness, quality and practice of counter-terrorist judicial review — 
and what is at the core of this collection, notwithstanding its internal debates and 
disagreements — is the maintenance of this basic constitutionalist commitment in the 
difficult, fractious and precarious state of counter-terrorist crisis. 
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